Fallimenti dell’intelligence e dell’allerta come fonti di rischio politico: lezioni dalla guerra in Ucraina

Abstract

This article examines intelligence and warning failures as underexamined yet critical sources of political risk, with a focus on the war in Ukraine. While political risk analysis has traditionally emphasised institutional instability, regulatory shifts and geopolitical tensions, the role of intelligence and early warning shortfalls remains insufficiently theorised. Drawing on Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the article argues that the invasion constitutes a forecasting failure whose causes were unevenly distributed: US and UK agencies assessed the threat correctly and disclosed it publicly, while French, German and Italian services misread Russian intentions. Particular attention is paid to the conceptual distinction between intelligence failure (the inability to correctly assess a situation) and warning failure (the failure to act on or communicate timely and accurate assessments). Approaching warning as a question of persuasive capacity reveals a further dynamic: Washington and London could not convince key partners, including Kyiv, that an attack was imminent. The article then asks why prominent observers ruled it out, drawing on prospect theory and groupthink, before discussing the consequences for political risk assessment and management. The findings underscore the need for companies to reassess and strengthen their internal risk intelligence capabilities, integrating robust early warning mechanisms and critical reflection on how knowledge is generated and acted upon in an increasingly uncertain geopolitical environment.